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“The West is doing it to us again,” a middle-aged man in the middle of 
a crowd told me. “It’s just the same as after the First World War; it’s just the 
same as after 1989. The West is trying to keep Hungary down.” 
The man wanted to make sure that I understood, and so he showed me 
one of the maps he was selling. It was a map of the Kingdom of Hungary, 
as it was constituted before and during the First World War, all around were 
the crests of the 64 historic counties of Hungary, and at the bottom were the 
words from Ferenc Erkel’s 1861 aria My Homeland, you mean everything to 
me (Hazám, Hazám, Te Mindenem!).1 “This is what we lost,” he said to me. 
In the same crowd, men wore t-shirts depicting the Kingdom of Hungary 
ripped apart by sinister, skeletal-like hands. The speaker on the stage began 
to speak of how the banks pay low taxes, but make big profits, and of “Bank 
terror” (bank rémület). Some in the crowd chanted: “Our home is not for 
sale!” (A haza nem eladó), meaning both their literal homes but also referring 
to the whole of the Hungary. The speaker said that her political party, Jobbik, 
would not let “the banks colonise Hungary,” to which the group of young 
skinheads next to me responded: “It’s the Jews! It’s the f*cking Jews! Stop 
the Jews!”2  
Unfortunately, in contemporary Hungary, anti-Semitism remains a very 
public part of the political landscape. Likewise, anti-Roma sentiments, even 
violence, also characterise the current political climate; in both cases these 
expressions of antagonistic politics are tied to the widely held political belief 
1 The aria is from the 1861 Erkel opera Bánk Bán, in which the protagonist named Bánk has 
the title Bán, which is the equivalent of a viceroy or a duke.
2 Author’s eyewitness report and interview at the Jobbik political rally in Vértanúk Tere, 
Budapest, 23 October 2013.
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among the political right that Hungary is under assault from outside forces, 
whether expressed as international global capitalism, as Jews, or trans-
local, “rootless” Roma painted as the perpetrators of cigánybűnozés, “gypsy 
crime.” Yet at least according to two of the leading politicians, heads of the 
two of the most popular political parties, another force appears to “threaten” 
Hungary. This is the European Union. Viktor Orbán, the prime minister and 
leader of the dominant political party Fidesz, frequently denounces Brussels, 
suggesting its bureaucrats engage in “imperialist” meddling in Hungarian 
affairs.3 Gabor Vona, the leader of the further right insurgent Jobbik party, 
which, since the 2014 local and municipal elections, has become Hungary’s 
second most popular party,4 likewise opposes Zionism, global capitalism, 
and its continental variant, European integration.5 This article will examine 
how both Fidesz and Jobbik cast the European Union as a dominating, even 
colonising force in order to justify their policies of nationalising certain 
industries and orienting their foreign policy objectives and potential partners 
and projects eastward. Nevertheless, the European Union is important to both 
Fidesz and to Jobbik. Fidesz and the Hungarian government remain reliant 
on the European Union for infrastructure funds, agricultural support, and 
access to markets. In the case of Jobbik, the European Parliament has been 
an important avenue through which their politicians obtained legitimacy, 
as well as a legitimate platform in the media from which to amplify their 
political message.   
Far Right Politics Immediately after 1989
Since the end of communism there has been widespread support for the 
political far right in Hungary. Almost immediately the symbolic politics of 
“national revival” gripped the Hungarian polity, and have, in the past 25 years, 
evolved into a daily politics characterised by anti-Semitism, anti-liberalism, 
and anti-Roma expressions. It is beneficial to see the roots of these sentiments 
as being connected to the legitimising politics of the earliest moments of the 
transition away from communism, in the days when the rule of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party (MSzMP) collapsed. The themes that emerged from 
that first 1990 campaign continue today. They include external persecution, 
3 D. Kelemen, “A Union of Values?,” Policy Network, 2 June 2014, www.policy-network.net.
4 “Local elections: Jobbik is now Hungary’s second largest party,” The New Observer, 
29 October 2014, http://newobserveronline.com.
5 F. Mazurczak, “Euroescepticism and the Emergence of East Central Europe’s Far Right: 
The End of the EU Honeymoon?,” Visegrad Insight, 27 May 2014, http://visegradinsight.eu.
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especially by Western institutions (whether they be the International Monetary 
Fund or the European Union), the threat of foreign dominance (especially in 
the economy), and the presence of an enemy alien within, either Jews, Roma, 
or a liberal “fifth column,” set on “destroying Hungarian culture.”      
Just as communism had always been different in Hungary—jokingly 
known as “the happiest barracks in the camp,” or at least known for its “gulyas-
socialist,” mixed economy, so too was Hungary’s transition after 1989. For 
while there had been round table negotiations in Hungary, just as in Poland, in 
Hungary there was not one opposition, but at least two, and in many regards 
there were matching factions within the Communist Party itself. This division 
within the opposition continues in the current forms and parties of contemporary 
Hungarian politics. On the one hand, there remain traces of the Democratic 
Opposition (Demokrata Ellenzék—DE) in the current Democratic Coalition 
(DK). But the current forms of both Fidesz and Jobbik can trace their roots 
back to the “popular-national” (népi-nemzeti) opposition, which articulated 
its political aspirations as commitments to the values of the “people and the 
nation.” Inside the Communist Party, formally known as the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party (MSzMP), populist reformers and such as Imre Pozsgay and 
Károly Grósz looked to join forces with populist opposition leaders, such as 
István Csurka and Sándor Csoóri, allowing them to create their own political 
organisation, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum—
MDF). The populist opposition support of Pozsgay and Grósz drove a wedge 
between the “democratic opposition” and the reformers within the MSzMP, 
as the populists attempted to wrestle the mantle of “speaking for the people” 
from the DE intellectuals. In doing so, the MDF located itself between the 
government and the opposition, and soon began to publically differentiate itself 
from the Democratic Opposition. They were so successful that the MDF won 
the first multi-party election, in 1990, with 42.49% of the vote, a margin of more 
than 18%6 over its nearest rival the Western oriented and social democratically 
inclined Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége—
SzDSz).7 Thus, the first Hungarian post-communist government was not 
pro-Western and liberal in orientation, but rather populist and nationalist. 
6 G. Schöpflin, “From Communism to Democracy in Hungary,” in: A. Bozóki et al. (eds.), 
Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1992, p. 102.
7 SzDSz also contained very liberal, if not neo-liberal elements, including the Hungarian 
Marxian philosopher Gáspár Miklós Tamás, who was going through a neo-liberal phase at 
the time.
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An air of pre-modern conservatism soon began to permeate MDF policies. 
Property restitution, particular for rural landholdings and church property, 
became an important issue of the day. Similarly, religious issues themselves 
began to dominate political debate. The MDF government proposed optional 
religious instruction in public schools and reintroduced state subsidies for 
religious institutions. The new government, led by the then prime minister, 
József Antall, launched a programme of “National Revival,” which made 
clear the new government’s intention to assert firmer control as the owner of 
state-held assets. The programme specifically stated its goal “to modify the 
legal position of state enterprises that have been transformed into companies 
during the period of “spontaneous privatisation,” and bring them under 
the control of state administration.8 This concern that the socialists were 
“selling off the ‘family’ silver” would become one of the repeated themes 
in Hungarian politics over the next 25 years. Anti-Semitism was to become 
another.   
As István Csurka stressed the need for a “Christian Course” he accused 
the SzDSz of being a “party of Jews,” and said the media was similarly 
populated with Jews who did not “defend the national interests.”9 Csurka and 
other members of the populist wing of the MDF also accused Jews of being 
the harbingers of “destructive modernism,” adding that the SzDSz and the 
socialists were engaged in a Jewish plot with capitalist organisations such as 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to “ruin” Hungary.10 
The then famous Hungarian poet, Sándor Csoóri, who, like Csurka was 
one of the MDF co-founders, similarly suggested that Jews were not “true” 
Hungarians for they could never comprehend “real Hungarian pain.”11 
This construction, which suggests that Jews cannot be “true” Hungarians, 
dates back to the early part of the twentieth century, following the end 
of the First World War, and was the basis for the Numerus Clausus laws, 
which limited access for Hungarian Jewry to universities, the civil service, 
and positions within certain professions, and even placed restrictions on 
property ownership. At the time, the then leader of Hungary, the Regent 
Admiral Miklós Horthy, said that it “was not a bad thing to frighten the 
8 ÁVÜ Annual Report 1992, Budapest. Quoted in A. Canning, P. Hare, “The Privatization 
Process—Economic and Political Aspects of the Hungarian Approach,” in: S. Estrin (ed.), 
Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, Longman, New York, 1994.
9 I. Csurka, Vasárnapi jegyzetek [Sunday Notes], February 1991, Budapest, pp. 35–37. 
10 Magyar Fórum, Budapest, 20 August 1992. 
11 S. Csoóri, “Nappali hold” [Daytime Moon], Hitel, 5 September, 1990, p. 6. 
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Jews a bit, because otherwise they became too insolent.”12 This invocation of 
the past restructured the political debate in the early days after the collapse 
of Realised Socialism. As the MDF lacked concrete economic strategies, 
the party attacked the SzDSz for its “excessively capitalist views,” while 
simultaneously attacking the Marxist pedagogies of many of the SzDSz 
intellectuals, claiming that these Lukács School sociologists and their students 
were closet Marxists, who would maintain strict socialism. Thus, the MDF 
attacked the SzDSz as being both too “socialist” and too “capitalist.” For 
example, Antall spoke of the “liberálbolsevisták”—the liberal/Bolsheviks—
who threatened the economic stability of Hungary.13 As the most outspoken 
member of the MDF, Csurka asserted, with little regard for the apparent 
ideological contradiction, that the “Jewish-communists” serve at the behest 
of “thieving capitalists.” In his inflammatory 1992 tract, Setting the Record 
Straight, published in Magyar Fórum, Csurka wrote of a liberal conspiracy 
to exploit Hungary.14 This combination of allied threat endures in the rhetoric 
of the Hungarian far right in the present. Urban communists, in league with 
their global capitalist allies, all of whom are “Jewish,” are believed by the 
many supporters of Jobbik and previous parties, to have plans to dismantle the 
Hungarian economy and destroy Hungarian values. In this way, Jewishness 
and Zionism are the “enemies” of Hungary, and anyone who is deemed to be 
an enemy by these far right politicians is likewise deemed to be “Jewish.” 
As will be described below, in 2014, even France’s Marine Le Pen and the 
Netherland’s Geert Wilders were accused by the Hungarian far right of being 
“Zionists.” 
However, for some even within the ranks of the MDF, Csurka’s rhetoric 
was too baldly anti-Semitic, too evocative of the anti-Semitism associated 
with the revanchist politics of the inter-war period and that of the fascists 
during the Second World War, who together with the German Nazis murdered 
450,000 Jews in the span of six weeks in the spring of 1944. In 1993, Csurka 
was expelled from the MDF, when he founded his own movement. Many 
members of the parliamentary faction left the MDF with Csurka to form the 
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja—MIÉP). 
The name of the new party was very telling, as it referenced the inter-war 
group, the Hungarian Life Movement (Magyar Élet Mozgalom), a pro-fascist 
12 T. Sakmyster, Hungary’s Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918–1944, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1994, p. 210.
13 Népszabadság, 19 September 1997.
14 Magyar Fórum, 20 August 1992. 
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group whose slogans proclaimed “national unity, discipline, land reform, and 
defence of the Hungarian race.”15 These would also become slogans chanted 
by members of the Hungarian far right well into the beginning of the twenty-
first century. Although the MÍEP failed miserably in the 1994 elections 
(receiving a mere 1.4% of the vote), Csurka was able to draw large crowds 
of supporters to rallies and political events. For example, in commemoration 
of the fortieth anniversary of the 1956 revolution, the MIÉP-sponsored 
rally was attended by 25,000 supporters,16 and a 1997 rally commemorating 
the 1848 Hungarian revolution against the Austrians attracted a crowd of 
150,000.17 For the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the 1848 revolution, 
the largest crowds attended the MIÉP rally in Hősök Tere, numbering more 
than 50,000, compared to only 5,000 at the government-sponsored rally, led 
by the socialists at Petőfi Sándor Tér.18 In 1998, Csurka gathered one of the 
largest crowds (200,000 people) at an outdoor post-communist political rally, 
demonstrating the immense support for MIÉP.19 Csurka once again thundered 
onto the mainstream political stage, declaring in an interview with Reuters 
news service that Hungary needed his programme of “national radicalism.” 
During a televised debate, between the first and second rounds of voting 
in 1998, Csurka completed his remarks by giving the fascist Arrowcross20 
salute of two outstretched fingers. This rhetoric resonated with those who 
felt dislocated from the economic shifts that accompanied the coming of 
capitalism. At an MIÉP rally on 15 March 1997, there was a young man 
standing in the crowd of nearly 150,000. He stated that he was university 
educated, held a “good job,” and “had many Jewish friends,” but he believed 
that the “Jews and the IMF control Hungary,” and that only the MIÉP, which 
represented “true” Hungarian values, could defend Hungary against the IMF.21 
In 1998, the MIÉP rebounded from its previous dismal electoral showing 
15 Cf. M. Szinai, L. Szűcs, The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy, Corvina Press, 
Budapest, 1965, p. 437.
16 Budapest Week, 31 October 1996.
17 Budapest Week, 20 March 1997.
18 Budapest Sun, 19 March 1998. 
19 Author’s interview with eyewitness, political analyst István Hegedűs, Chicago, 26 May 
1998. 
20 The explicitly fascist Arrowcross party, led by Ferenc Szálasi, formed the government of 
Hungary from October 1944 until Budapest’s liberation by the Red Army in March 1945. 
The Arrowcross was responsible for tens of thousands of deaths of mostly Jewish and 
Roma Hungarians. The Arrowcross is seen as the Hungarian equivalent of the German 
Nazi movement, and it was Arrowcross founder Gyula Gömbös who coined the term 
“national socialism” in 1921 as an explicitly anti-communist political movement.
21 Author’s interview, Budapest, 15 March 1997. 
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by garnering 5.55% of the national vote, and secured 13 parliamentary 
seats. However, in the same elections, even though the reformed former 
communists, as the Hungarian Socialist Party, won more votes both on the 
national list and within single member constituencies, the Alliance of Young 
Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége—Fidesz) won the most seats, and 
formed a centre-right coalition government with the MDF and the agrarian 
Independent Small Holders Party (FKgP). As the MDF split with the Csurka 
expulsions, and lost the 1994 elections to a resurgent Socialist Party, Viktor 
Orbán, as the leader of Fidesz, saw a political opportunity, and purged the 
more liberal and leftist elements from the party and significantly re-orienting 
it to the right of centre. Over the years, Fidesz would come to dominate this 
right of centre position. With the socialists re-cast as the European liberals, 
not dissimilar to the neo-liberal French or Spanish socialist parties, and little 
political interests in the Green Party and others to the left of the socialists, the 
functional space of political opposition and contention beyond the socialists 
was the space to the right of Fidesz.         
The Rise of Jobbik
In the immediate aftermath of the changes of 1989 and 1990 in Hungary, 
there was a collapse of the politics of the left. The reformed Socialist Party, 
which split from the rump of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, was 
nearly wiped out in the 1990 election, managing to win seats in only 15 of 
296 constituencies, garnering only a total of 33 seats. The Alliance of Free 
Democrats, which became the opposition in 1990, was seen as a liberal 
party, inviting ideas from the West, and joining the Alliance for Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe. In 1994, the reformed Socialists were able to 
return to power. During that campaign, the MSzP proclaimed itself the party 
of experts. It emphasised its experience in running the government and 
promised to improve the economic situation. The MSzP also promised to 
increase the pace of privatisation and governmental restructuring, and like 
many Socialist parties across Europe, especially in France and similar to 
the UK’s New Labour, the MSzP embraced the tenets of neo-liberalism. 
However, the Socialist Party’s rhetoric was also tempered by a promise of 
social democracy and the continuation of state welfare against the social 
and economic disruption of marketisation. The party also appealed to 
a “technocratic middle class.” It directly targeted educated workers and 
those who had “done well” under the previous system, but had experienced 
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economic decline under the MDF government.22 In fact, Evans and Whitefield, 
while examining the 1994 Hungarian elections, did not find large numbers 
of manual labour workers voting for the MSzP, rather most of them chose 
to stay away from the polls; an incredible 62.6% of these workers abstained 
from voting.23 For the most part, the Socialist Party’s supporters tended to be 
“pragmatic” on economic issues and cooperation with the West. Additionally, 
although the Socialist Party won an absolute majority (209 of the 386 seats), 
the MSzP invited the Alliance of Free Democrats to join them in a coalition, 
furthering the connection between them and Western liberalism.
The large tasks of the political transition, such as the development of 
the rule of law and privatisation, were seen as only benefiting the elites of 
the previous regime. Liberal principles, such as the rule of law, came to be 
seen as a “pseudonym of class rule” and property rights as the “hypocritical 
description of exploitation and organised theft.”24 The crisis of the legitimacy 
of communism gave way to a crisis of the legitimacy of liberal principles 
and capitalism for those who fared poorly during the initial phases of the 
transition. The Hungarian philosopher Gáspár Miklós Tamás wrote at the 
time: “The collapse of communism has proved in the eyes of the new ethnic 
or tribal warriors that there is no such thing as politics; crude personal 
interest is not mediated by anything like law, which is the ridiculously and 
transparently mendacious device of the powerful anyway.”25 
It was in this environment that Fidesz turned toward the right. If there 
was to be a critique of neo-liberalism, it was to be from the right and not 
from the left. While the Fidesz leadership, especial Viktor Orbán, thought it 
could gain significantly from making such a critique from the right, it was 
unprepared for the rise of Jobbik.
A new phase of Hungarian right wing politics began in 2003 with the 
creation of the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért 
Mozgalom), more commonly known simply as Jobbik. The word itself is 
an interesting word play, in that jobb means both “better” and the direction 
“to the right,” thus, the comparative form of the word jobbik can mean 
both that which is better and that which is further to the right. Jobbik is the 
22 G. Evans, S. Whitefield, “Social and Ideological Cleavage Formation in Post-communist 
Hungary,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, no. 7, 1995, pp. 1177–1204.
23 Ibidem.
24 G.M. Tamás, “Ethnarchy and Ethno-anarchism,” Social Research, vol. 63, no. 1, 1996, 
pp. 147–190. 
25 Ibidem.
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“better” and “further to the right” choice. Gábor Vona, one of the founding 
members of the party in 2003, became leader in 2006, and took the party 
into an electoral alliance with the older far right, nationalist party MIÉP, the 
Hungarian Truth and Life Party, for that year’s parliamentary election cycle. 
The MIÉP–Jobbik Third Way Alliance only garnered 2% of the vote, and 
won no seats. The subsequent end of the acrimonious alliance represented 
a passing of the baton as István Csurka’s MIÉP dissolved, and Vona became 
one of the most prominent players on the far right. In the next parliamentary 
election, in 2010, Jobbik enjoyed great success, securing 47 seats, finishing 
as the third largest party with nearly 17% of the vote. Jobbik was becoming 
a true force in Hungarian politics. In the 2014 campaign, Jobbik polled very 
well among young people,26 and while their number of seats in parliament 
decreased to only 23, the entire number of parliamentary seats was reduced 
from 386 to only 199. So while the number of Jobbik seats was cut in half, the 
overall percentage of the popular vote, especially important for the national 
lists seats, increased to 20%. The Jobbik seats represented roughly the same 
percentage of overall seats from the previous parliament. Further after the 
election, Jobbik became the second largest party, as the left-liberal Unity was 
a campaign-only coalition of five parties that did not always see eye to eye 
on parliamentary issues.  
In the October 2014 municipal elections, Jobbik demonstrated that it had 
nation-wide support by finishing second in 18 of 19 counties in Hungary, 
also winning control of 14 towns and villages. In April 2015, Jobbik won its 
first single member constituency, in a by-election following the death of the 
Fidesz incumbent Jenő Lasztovicza. The seat was won by Lajos Rig, seen as 
a fresh and incorrupt new face in politics, albeit one who had a reputation 
as being an adamant anti-Semite, and was rumoured to sport an SS tattoo. 
The campaign slogan “We’ll say it and we’ll do it” was intended as a slap 
to Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government, which was increasingly seen as by 
Jobbik as a corrupt, ruling elite governing for itself rather than for the 
Hungarian people. As Jobbik seeks to increase its electoral support, it looks 
to convince more people that it is capable of governing, and to moderate 
its positions, or at least make them appear more palatable. A good deal of 
energy and effort is put into making the party look professional. One way 
of doing this has been through the separation of party political functions, 
26 D. Varga, “Miért szavaz egy fiatal lány a Jobbikra?” [Why would a young girl vote for 
Jobbik?], Népszabadság, 16 May 2014, http://nol.hu.
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communications and allied group activities through the creation of direct 
action organs. The symbols, language, rhetoric, and even sartorial choices set 
the Jobbik party apart from the direct action groups. Vona wears a suit; the 
direct action network members often do not. 
The Creation of Direct Action Groups
In 2007, and with the blessing of his party, Vona founded the Magyar 
Gárda, or Hungarian Guard, as a direct action organisation intended to 
“strengthen national self defence” and assist in “maintaining public order.”27 
The organisation was founded with a mass loyalty oath ceremony, during 
which its members sported black boots, forage caps, and bandanas of red 
and white stripes. The latter represent the proscribed Arpad Flag, associated 
with the Second World War era Hungarian fascist organisation the Arrow 
Cross (see illustrations 3 and 4). The Metropolitan Court of Budapest 
disbanded Magyar Gárda in 2009,28 but the group has reorganised under at 
least three banners, as the Új Magyar Gárda (New Hungarian Guard), the 
Magyar Nemzeti Gárda (Hungarian National Guard), and the Szebb Jövőért 
Polgárőr Egyesület (Civil Guard Association for a Better Hungarian Future). 
Szebb Jövőért is the most active of the three, and has its roots in paramilitary 
organisations from the inter-war period and the Second World War. These 
groups work together, with one another, with the Jobbik party, and with other 
groups.
For example, in August 2012, members of Új Magyar Gárda, Magyar 
Nemzeti Gárda, Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület, Betyársereg (the Outlaws’ 
Army), Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (the Hungarian National Front), and 
Véderő (Defence) converged on the small village of Devecser to demonstrate 
against cigánybűnozés or “gypsy crime.” The demonstration began with 
a welcome from the Jobbik affiliated Veszprém county chairman Gábor 
Ferenczi, who told the assembled that “self defence is a fundamental right.”29 
The “self defence” was for ethnic Hungarians and so-called Hungarian 
“values” only, which by definition the Roma residents of Devecser do not 
hold. Zsolt Tyirityán, the leader of the Betyársereg, stated that he would use 
27 Alapito nyilatkozat [Establishment Manifesto], 25 August 2007.
28 The court passed the ruling in December 2008, and it was upheld by the Budapest Tribunal 
(court of appeals) in July 2009.
29 “A cigánybűnözők felett győzött a nemzeti összefogás” [National unity prevails over 
criminal elements], Szentkoronaradio, 6 August 2012, www.old.szentkoronaradio.com/
devecser.
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“any means necessary to protect our race. I am a racist and I am proud of 
it, because I love my race I’m going to defend it.”30 The demonstrators then 
began throwing bottles and rocks at homes they believed to belong to Roma, 
and shouted “you are going to die here.”31 This was no idle threat, as the 
events in Devecser resembled those the year before in the small village of 
Gyöngyöspata in the northeast corner of Hungary.
In March and April 2011, elements of these far right direct action groups 
descended upon Gyöngyöspata and decided that they would run “military 
exercises” and walk “security patrols” to defend the residents against crime. 
Véderő announced that it was going to establish a paramilitary training 
centre in the Roma section of town.32 As the police had done nothing to 
stop the incursions by the paramilitary groups, Richard Field, an American 
businessman, with assistance from the Hungarian Red Cross, organised the 
evacuation of around 270 Roma women and children from the beleaguered 
village.33 The village became such a focal point for tensions between far 
right militants and the Roma community that the Hungarian National Front 
(MNA) published on their web page that they believe the confrontations in 
Gyöngyöspata were the “outbreak of a cleansing civil war.”34 Since then, the 
MNA has held monthly paramilitary exercises either at their headquarters on 
a former Soviet military base outside of Bőny, or in other cities all around 
the country. These groups coordinate with one another, and organise training 
exercises not only for other Hungarian groups, but for groups across the 
region.35 The Hungarian National Front does this because, according to their 
propaganda materials, they believe that civil war is imminent.  
30 Ibidem. On the next commemorations of the 1956 uprising, 23 October 2012, Tyirityán gave 
a speech in which he vented his hate against certain Jews who he said “should be put on 
into freight cars and taken a good distance away and put to work.” See: “Outrageous police 
reaction to crimes against Hungarian Roma,” Hungarian Spectrum: reflections on politics, 
economics, and culture, 7 October 2103, www.hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com.
31 Ibidem.
32 “Hungary Roma battle far-right vigilantes,” BBC News, 27 April 2011, www.bbc.co.uk.
33 “Right-wing Militants on Patrol: A New Wave of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary,” Der 
Spiegel Online, 27 April 11, www.spiegel.de.
34 To “celebrate” the anniversary of the Hungarian–German attempted breakout from the 
Siege of Budapest of 11 February 1945, Blood and Honour Hungary, the Sixty-Four 
Counties Youth Movement, the New Hungarian Guard, the Hungarian National Front and 
Pax Hungarica met with representatives of the German National Front. This has become 
an annual event. Athena Institute, Hungarian National Front Profile, www.athenainstitute.
eu/en/map/olvas/20.
35 Ibidem.
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In the logic of the Jobbik affiliated direct action groups, and within the 
rhetoric of Jobbik itself, Jews and Roma become two sides of the same 
threatening coin. For the extreme right, and increasingly for more politically 
mainstream Hungarians, a shared fantasy of small-scale crimes by Roma 
is allied with conspiracy theories concerning large-scale financial crimes 
perpetrated by bankers and the European capital. In this paranoid fantasy, 
both must be violently opposed. Moreover, just as Roma are habitually 
associated with the commission of pretty crime, larger financial degradations 
associated with globalisation and capitalism are often attributed to Jews. This 
combination could be seen in a December 2012 propaganda campaign from 
the Hungarian National Front (MNA), which claimed “…a virtual bulldozer 
is destroying our country. The blade of the bulldozer is made up of gypsy 
criminals and its driver, who is directing the whole process, is the Zionist 
Jewry.”36 Similarly, Zsolt Tyirityán declared at a November 2013 anti-Roma 
demonstration in Vác, that people “should stop being the prey and start being 
the predators” vis-à-vis Roma. In Pécs, in February 2014, he declared vis-à-
vis the ruling class that “it might be a better solution for those with debts in 
foreign currencies if one started killing the banks and the tax advisors.” In 
October 2013, Tyirityán observed that “burning financial institutions will be 
the symbols of our age.”  
Oppose Roma! Oppose the Bankers! Oppose Jews!
If there was any doubt regarding the connection between Vona and Jobbik 
with Zsolt Tyirityán and his Betyársereg, one need only look to a February 
2014 campaign rally that Jobbik held in the former synagogue that became 
Esztergom’s civic hall with the coming of communism. Vona and Jobbik 
wanted to hold the event there to demonstrate that that “true Hungarians” 
could go anywhere and say anything, including discussing the “evils of 
capitalism” in a former synagogue.37 While Vona addressed the 200 or 
so Jobbik supporters inside, Tyirityán’s Betyársereg provided “security” 
to defend the Jobbik speakers against the nearly 100 demonstrators who 
protested outside, some with yellow Stars of David pinned to their chests. One 
demonstrator, who herself is a Holocaust survivor, told Agence-France Press 
36 Ibidem.
37 Athena Institute, Outlaws Army Profile, http://athenainstitute.eu.
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2015, no. 2 91
 The Rise of Jobbik, Populism, and the Symbolic Politics …
“it’s disgusting that anti-Semites are able to get away with this provocation 
in modern Hungary.”38  
In 2009, Betyársereg and Jobbik signed a cooperation agreement, saying 
that “we support each other and take part in each other’s events.”39 While 
Betyársereg does not receive funds directly from Jobbik, it did have access 
to more than 40 million forint (approximately €130,000) provided by the 
Jobbik Party Foundation to the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement.40 
Tamás Sneider, vice-president of Jobbik, stated recently that the relationship 
between Betyársereg and Jobbik “must be acknowledged to be a division of 
labour. It’s good to have an Outlaw’s Army; it’s nice to have the Sixty-Four 
Counties because they are able to do what I cannot from inside parliament.”41 
The separation of the direct action groups from the formal political/
parliamentary party of Jobbik, allows the party itself to suggest that it is more 
moderate, without actually alienating the participants in the direct action 
groups. The separation also allows the party to claim that it does not endorse 
violence in any way. Jobbik told Reuters news service through a communiqué 
that “Jobbik condemns violence, and its members cannot be linked to such 
acts either.”42 It is well understood that it is possible to be an active member 
in both, and this is evident at any Jobbik rally, where participants sport the 
uniforms and other sartorial attire that denotes membership of Betyársereg, 
Szebb Jövőért, or Magyar Gárda. Szebb Jövőért in particular invites women 
and young people to join the ranks of the group, often organising family 
camping events, and other group activities, especially in the summer. Family 
life, especially collective activities away from mass consumption, tie the 
political message of these groups to a way of social being, suggesting that 
the other political parties are insensitive to the politics of everyday life. On 
the other hand, having the formal political organisation separate allows Vona 
to cultivate the appearance and gravitas of a statesman. Ironically, this has 
been enhanced by his organisation’s presence in the European Parliament.
38 “Rally in Ex-Synagogue Sparks Fury in Hungary,” Aljazeera, 15 February 2014, 
www.aljazeera.com/news.  
39 T. Fabian, “Náci vagyok, vállalom! Vona meg a barátom” [I am a Nazi! I accept that! Vona 
is my friend], Index.hu, 15 June 2015, http://index.hu.
40 Ibidem.
41 Ibidem.
42 M. Goettig, C. Lowe, “Special Report: from Hungary, far-right party spreads ideology, 
tactics,” Reuters.com, 9 April 2014, www.reuters.com.
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The Paradox of the European Union
One profound paradox of democracy within the European Union has 
been the ability of far right political groups across the Member States to 
find political legitimacy through the European Parliament. Jobbik has 
likewise used the occasion of European parliamentary elections to change 
the perception of its standing and mobilise capabilities.43 After the disastrous 
parliamentary alliance with the MÍEP in 2006, in which the combined lists of 
the two parties barely received more than 2% of the vote, and only little more 
than 100,000 votes,44 Vona set his sights on the 2009 MEP elections. Jobbik 
dramatically reversed its fortunes, securing nearly 15% of the vote, winning 
three of Hungary’s 22 seats, and working in alliance with an MDF candidate 
for a fourth. This performance was nearly equal to the then governing 
Hungarian Socialist Party’s four seats, and demonstrated that Vona could 
organise and win an election campaign. In Strasbourg and in Brussels the 
three Jobbik members sit with the other so called non-aligned members 
(non-inscrits), including members of the French Front National (FN), Geerts 
Wilders’ Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), Greece’s Golden Dawn, and the 
Italian Northern League.
Krisztina Morvai, one of the members of the Jobbik delegation, has 
one the one hand a prestigious curriculum vitae, including teaching law in 
the United States, serving on the European Commission of Human Rights, 
and being a member of the United Nations’ Women’s Anti-discrimination 
Committee. On the other hand, she warned “liberal-Bolshevik Zionists” 
living in Hungary to “start thinking about where to flee and where to hide” 
once Jobbik comes to power.45 Further, Morvai rather cynically used her 
43 The founder of France’s Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, used this to great effect when 
he was first elected to the European Parliament in 1984, and then subsequently in every EP 
election until 2009. In just the second election to the European Parliament in Strasbourg 
since its inaugural direct election in 1979, the FN managed to garner nearly 11% of the 
French vote, securing 10 of France’s 81 seats. Le Pen immediately formed a Parliamentary 
Group, ER, or European Right, which was joined by five members of the fascist Italian 
Social Movement (MSI), and one member of the Greek National Political Union (EPEN), 
founded by Colonel’s Junta leader Georgios Papadopoulos. Le Pen was suddenly no 
longer a merely French politician, especially popular in the south, but, following the 1984 
election, he had a continental platform. As the leader of a parliamentary group he became a 
figure to be quoted by the mainstream political press, and had to be treated with the respect 
appropriate to that position.  
44 The alliance received 119,000 votes, or 2.2%, finishing fifth overall and coming nowhere 
near the 5% threshold required to win seats.
45 “Der Marsch auf Budapest,” Jungle World, no. 13, 26 March 2009, http://jungle-world.com.
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reputation as an advocate for human rights in 2010, when, after walking 
the halls of the European Parliament in a “Free Budaházy” t-shirt, she 
nominated György Budaházy for the Council of Europe Human Prize, for his 
“languishing in a Hungarian jail for a year without being charged.46 Budaházy 
and 16 others were days later charged with terrorism offences, relating to 
bomb manufacturing and systematically intimidating leftist activists and 
journalists. Morvai has defended the Magyar Gárda from the floor of the 
European Parliament, as have her Jobbik colleagues. One, Csanád Szegedi,47 
wore the Magyar Gárda uniform to his inaugural parliamentary session.48 
Sitting among the non-inscrits has allowed Jobbik to build a number of 
trans-European political alliances and supports, funnelling money to allied 
movements and organisations. In this way, the very institution that these non-
aligned parties oppose facilitates their cooperation, and perhaps their very 
growth.  
In many ways it is in the environment of the European Parliament that 
Jobbik is best able to advance its political ambitions. For example, at the all-
EU meeting of the European Affairs Committee, held in Riga in June 2015, 
Jobbik MEP Tibor Bana denounced the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, stated that European energy security was dependent upon 
good relations with Russia, and further promoted energy diversification by 
suggesting the European Union should be open to Iranian and Algerian gas 
deliveries.49 
Similarly, Jobbik MEPs represented the only party not to support a draft 
resolution suspending Russia’s voting rights in the Council of Europe. 
Márton Gyöngyösi wrote on Jobbik’s web page that the party considered 
the proposal “unacceptable on moral grounds.”50 He similarly denounced 
NATO as “serving American interests unconditionally,” and said that 
46 “Far Right Demands Budaházy’s Release,” Budapest Times, 21 September 2010, 
www.budapesttimes.hu.
47 In a surreal turn of events, Szegedi’s Jewish ancestry was discovered in 2012. He was 
expelled from Jobbik, resigned his seat in the European Parliament, and now practises 
orthodox Judaism, traveling to schools and community centres around Hungary to discuss 
hate crime.
48 “Jobbik MEP wears banned Hungarian Guard uniform to first session,” Politics.
hu, 14 July 2009; see also A. Holland, “Fascist follies in the European Parliament,” 
Adamhollandblogspot, July 2009, http://adamholland.blogspot.co.uk.
49 Jobbik, “Definite ‘No’ to the United States of Europe,” 3 June 2015, www.jobbik.com.
50 Jobbik, “Jobbik finds the Council of Europe’s anti-Russia sanctions worrying,” 
www.jobbik.com.
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a deterioration of relations with Western Europe, due to its cooperation with 
the United States, was “not in the interests of Russia.”51 This theme, that the 
EU is corrupted by the United States and that American culture is in itself 
corrupt, is regularly repeated by Jobbik representatives. Vona told The Voice 
of Russia, “today’s ‘Rome’, the USA, spreads a subhuman culture which has 
nothing but economic interests.”52 It is perhaps ironic that, via the platform 
of the European Union, and especially the European Parliament, Jobbik 
members are able to find a far larger audience to disseminate their anti-
capitalist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma views. Jobbik disrupts EU attempts 
to speak with one voice on issues ranging from human rights to the crisis in 
Ukraine, while at the same time appearing to promote Russian interests, or at 
least to counter American ones. While the themes are often also articulated 
by other far right parties, Jobbik sees itself as being among the most popular 
“right wing parties in Europe” and could potentially lead a new movement 
to the right, and to the east, with cooperation among right-wing parties, thus 
extending to relations with Russia, Turkey and Iran.53
Follow the Money
As far back as the 1990s, Jean-Marie Le Pen readily proved that he 
and the Front National were allies of the Hungarian far right. He would 
frequently attend MIÉP rallies and fund raisers. At one event, on the fortieth 
anniversary of the 1956 uprising, Le Pen visited Budapest to give a speech 
warning against globalisation, global capitalism, and the potential “return of 
communism,” which was warmly welcomed and loudly applauded.54 More 
recently, in 2012, Bruno Gollnisch, FN Member of the European Parliament, 
took the stage at a Jobbik October 23 rally, and stirred the audience by 
opening his speech with the words “Nem, nem, soha” (No, no, never), the 
historical refusal of the Horthy government to accept the losses of territory 
and population imposed upon Hungary at the end of the First World War 
by the Treaty of Trianon.55 The audience responded with chants of “Down 
with Trianon.” Gollnisch added that, just as the “Hungarian nation rebelled 
against the dictatorship of the Soviet Union” in 1956, Hungarians also “set 
51 Jobbik, “Provocation against Russia not in the interests of Hungary and Europe,” 
www.jobbik.com.
52 Jobbik, “Voice of Russia Interview with Gabor Vona,” www.jobbik.com.
53 Jobbik, “Jobbik is the strongest right-wing party in Europe,” www.jobbik.com.
54 Author eyewitness, Budapest, 23 March 1996.
55 “Bruno Gollnisch: Trianon Unjust,” www.jobbik.com.
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an example in resistance against Euro-global union.”56 He continued, stating 
that “the European Union imposes [on] everyone the intemperate flow of 
goods, people and capital, the import of such goods, which are produced at 
an iniquitously low cost and destroys our enterprises, the mass emigration, 
which absorbs our people, and the foreign capital, which appropriates our 
assets. You have the right to choose another destiny.”57 For 20 years there has 
been support from France for the Hungarian political far right.
However, unexpectedly, following the great electoral success among 
far right parties across Europe in the May 2014 European Parliamentary 
election, the potential to create a new Euro-sceptic far-right bloc was actually 
dashed by Marine Le Pen. Thirty years after her father created the European 
Right Group, Marine Le Pen vowed that she would not form an alliance with 
Jobbik, the Greek Golden Dawn, or Bulgarian Ataka, specifically mentioning 
Jobbik’s anti-Semitic rhetoric. In May 2015, Marine Le Pen suspended her 
own father, and founder of the Front National, over similar concerns about 
the party being seen as Nazi-sympathisers. Upon the news that Le Pen would 
not include Jobbik in a potential anti-EU integration block, Vona accused 
both Le Pen and the FN, as well as Geerts Wilders and the PVV, of being 
Zionists. In June 2014, Vona stated explicitly “we do not make alliances 
with Zionist parties, like the French Front National, the Austrian Freedom 
Party or the Dutch Party of Freedom, simply for financial reasons.”58 Márton 
Gyöngyösi, Jobbik parliamentary caucus leader, told Arthur White of the 
Budapest Times something similar back in February 2014, stating that he 
thought Le Pen and Wilders had their priorities wrong, and that liberalism 
and Zionism are the enemies, not Islam.59 Gyöngyösi suggested that all 
promoters of “traditionalism,” regardless of religion, should share the 
common enemy of liberalism, saying “the common enemy of traditionalists, 
regardless of where they come from, is liberalism, which wants to sweep 




58 “French, Austrian far-right parties ‘Zionist’: Hungary’s Jobbik,” EU Business, 26 June 
2014, www.eubusiness.com.
59 J.A. White, “Jobbik to Wilders and Le Pen: Liberalism and Zionism are the Enemies, not 
Islam,” Budapest Times, 22 February 2014, http://budapesttimes.hu.
60 Ibidem.
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Even as the ties of cooperation linking the far right of Hungary and of 
France appear to weakening, Jobbik is building stronger new relationships to 
the north and south, rather than the west. Jobbik has been engaged in a series 
of reciprocal events with the Polish political group National Movement 
(Ruch Narodowy). In November 2013 Gyöngyösi addressed 150 Ruch 
Narodowy members, urging regional cooperation, especially between 
Hungary and Poland. Following the event, Jobbik issued a press release 
stating that the party hoped “that Central and Eastern Europe could unite as an 
alliance that spreads from the Adriatic to the Baltic to counter Euro-Atlantic 
suppression.”61 RN’s leader, Robert Winnicki, at the 1956 commemoration 
ceremonies in Budapest in 2013, articulated this common goal. He identified 
that important common issues in both Poland and Hungary included the 
local control of agricultural land, away from mass holdings by large-scale 
agro-corporations.62 Gyöngyösi also addressed the second congress of Ruch 
Narodowy in May 2014, and RN and Jobbik held another joint rally in 
Budapest on this year’s Petöfi Sándor day, 15 March 2015.
This cooperation can also be found between Jobbik and groups in the 
south of Central Europe, such as in Croatia and Bulgaria. Angel Dzhambazki, 
from Bulgaria’s National Movement (VMRO), said its “close cooperation” 
with Jobbik and a Croatian group had helped the Bulgarian movement to 
grow, adding “we invited them to participate in our meetings, and at the 
same time we take part in events organised by them [Jobbik].”63 Dzhambazki 
sees the VMRO as being similar to Jobbik in being a “defender of ordinary 
people” against Syrian immigration, against “the Gypsy question,” and 
against “the destruction of a European value system.”64 The VMRO joined 
with other nationalist parties in the electoral alliance “Patriotic Front,” which 
won 7.29% of the popular vote and took 19 seats in the Bulgarian parliament.
One of the biggest worries for many analysts is not the shared electoral 
politics and rhetoric, but the spread of the direct action groups, operating 
either in league with or autonomous from the larger political organisations. 
Marcin Goettig and Christain Lowe describe, in a Reuters special report, the 
cooperation between Jobbik and Ruch Narodowy, an encounter they had with 
Polish paramilitaries, organised in what the participants called “chorągiew,” 
61 M. Goettig, C. Lowe, op. cit.
62 Author eyewitness of RN leader Robert Winnicki’s speech, Budapest, 23 October 2013.
63 M. Goettig, C. Lowe, op. cit.
64 Y. Kosharevska, “Interview with MEP Candidate Angel Dzhambazki,” One Europe, 
23 May 2014, http://one-europe.info.
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a historical word previously used to describe Polish cavalry formations. The 
group seemed to the reporters to be quite similar to the types of paramilitaries 
found among the Hungarian direct action groups. When one of the individuals 
participating was asked about his motivation, he simply replied that he “finally 
had to do something” in the face of all the tradition being broken by Brussels. 
While addressing a crowd of Jobbik supports in Budapest, Winnicki, said 
“following your example, we are organising a national movement today in 
Poland.” With more martial rhetoric, Winnicki concluded his remarks by 
saying “an army is quickly growing in Poland, which soon, on its section of 
the front, will join the battle you are conducting, and together we will march 
to victory.”65 With increased funds, the opportunities to train in Hungary, 
and far right political activists returning from eastern Ukraine (even if these 
number only a few handfuls), these organisations pose a very real and serious 
threat of violence to Roma communities, other non-white communities, the 
LGBT community, and immigrant communities throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Perhaps the most politically troubling for the European Union is the 
persistent assertions of the presence of financial connections between Jobbik 
and the governments of Russia and Iran. Not long after Jobbik’s prominent 
showing in the 2010 parliamentary elections, Gabriel Ronay, writing in The 
Herald of Scotland, reported that the Hungarian Public Prosecutor’s Office 
was investigating claims that Béla Kovács, then a Jobbik foreign policy 
advisor, was Moscow’s money channel, bringing funds directly from the 
Kremlin into the party’s coffers.66 In the same piece, Ronay suggested that 
MEP Morvai received cash gifts from Iran, and “is known in Brussels for her 
pro-Iran views.”67 In 2010, she attended a “human rights conference” hosted 
by the then-President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and met with Iranian 
political officials. In May 2014, the assertions of a connection between 
Jobbik and Moscow continued when Jávor Benedek of the Hungarian 
political party “Politics Can Be Different” (LMP), claimed in the Budapest 
daily Magyar Nemzet that Béla Kovács, now a Jobbik MEP, is regarded in 
Brussels as “a lobbyist for Russia and Gazprom, someone whose career 
65 Author eyewitness, Budapest, 23 October 2013. See also M. Goettig, C. Lowe, op. cit.
66 G. Ronay, “Hungary’s far-right backed by ‘rolling Moscow roubles’,” Herald Scotland, 
13 June 2010, www.heraldscotland.com.
67 Ibidem.
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clearly demonstrates a commitment to Russia.”68 It was further alleged that 
Kovács was spying on EU institutions for the Russians.69 The consequences 
of this connection between Jobbik and the Kremlin are significant, as Jobbik 
MEPs oppose EU sanctions against Russia, inflame the Ukrainian crisis, and 
disrupt EU foreign policy.  
However, such positions are not Jobbik’s alone. Tibor Navracsics, 
from Fidesz, asserted that EU sanctions in response to Russian activities in 
Ukraine hurt Hungary more than Russia, claiming that Hungary was losing 
€223,000 each day due to the suspension of economic activity with Russia. 
Such declarations led Roland Gúr of the Hungarian Socialist Party to quip 
“Jobbik and Fidesz are competing as to which one can better serve Russia’s 
interests.”70 
This confluence of Russian interest and cooperation from Jobbik and 
Fidesz is most apparent in the rhetoric of “Eurasianism.” As Orbán declared 
in a May 2014 speech that Hungary “continues the policy of openness to 
the East,” he pressed further that Hungarian identity regarding citizenship 
questions in Ukraine must be “revisited,” and that the 200,000 ethnic 
Hungarians in western Ukraine should receive dual citizenship with Hungary. 
He further added that “Hungarian questions of the Second World War remain 
unresolved.”71 This insistence on revisiting border issues parallels the Russian 
position on a federalised Ukraine. Jobbik goes even further, suggesting 
that just as Crimea is Russian, the Carpathian region of western Ukraine is 
Hungarian (Kárpátalja-Magyar).72 These Hungarian claims on Ukraine make 
it difficult for the European Union to speak with one voice on the ongoing 
conflict. In these ways, attempts to create a unified European Union foreign 
policy on many issues, but especially on Ukraine and Iran, have often been 
made more difficult by Jobbik and Fidesz. But while EU President Jean-
Claude Juncker jokingly called Orbán a “dictator,” and playfully slapped 
68 “Felfüggeszthetik Kovács Béla EP-beli mentelmi jogát” [European Union Suspends Bela 
Kovacs’ Immunity], Mandiner.hu, 7 January 2015, http://mandiner.hu. 
69 “Investigation under way against Jobbik MEP for spying against EU,” Politics.hu, 15 May 
2014, www.politics.hu. 
70 Ibidem.
71 R. Field, “Viktor Orbán re-elected Prime Minister of Hungary,” Budapest Beacon, 12 May 
2014, http://budapestbeacon.com.
72 “A Jobbik gyűjtést szervez a Kárpátaljai Magyar családik megsegítésére” [Jobbik helps 
Transcarpathian Hungarian families], Videk.ma, 5 May 2015, www.videk.ma.
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him on the cheek,73 Vona has gone so far as to demand a referendum similar 
to the one called by British Prime Minister David Cameron, as to whether 
Hungary should even remain in the European Union. Vona said, in a June 
2015 speech, that “Europe is in crisis; Europe is sick.”74 Whether Jobbik is 
actively anti-EU or pro-Russian, the activities in the European Parliament 
and the close connections revealed in frequent trips and lectures, such as Vona 
giving a lecture at Lomonosov University in Moscow in May 2013 at the 
invitation of Russian far right “Eurasianist” Alexander Dugin, are certainly 
an irritant for Brussels, and have led to discussions among political scientists 
as to whether Jobbik and other far right parties in the European Parliament 
are acting as “Russia’s Trojan Horse.”75 In the end, this may be a relationship 
of convenience, whereby Jobbik is happy to receive funds, stand against the 
transatlantic capitalism it associates with the European Union and the United 
States, and suggest that politics for Europe lie to the East and not to the 
wWest. If that appears pro-Russian, so be it; if it is seen as anti-EU, all the 
better for Jobbik.  
Being the Far-Right Party in an Environment of Illiberal Politics
For some analysts, however, the greater threat to democracy in Hungary 
comes not from Jobbik and its allied organisations, but from Orbán himself 
and his Fidesz government. On the one hand, allies of the government, 
for example Zsolt Bayer, Orbán’s friend, confident and co-founder of the 
contemporary organisation of Fidesz, wrote inflammatory remarks in 
response to the revelation that the two assailants involved in the 2013 New 
Year’s Eve stabbing of two men in a pub in the small town of Szigethalom, 
just outside of Budapest, were both Roma. Bayer wrote in the right-leaning 
newspaper Magyar Hírlap that a significant part of Hungary’s Roma 
population should be considered “animals” and excluded from society. He 
added “this part of the Gypsy population are animals, and behave as animals 
… let there be no more animals. A solution must be found, immediately and 
73 “EU’s Juncker calls Hungarian PM ‘dictator’, slaps him on the cheek,” Today’s Zaman.com, 
25 May 2015, www.todayszaman.com. 
74 “Vona: ‘Europe is in crisis; Europe is sick’,” www.jobbik.com.
75 See: V. Petsinis, “Random friends or asymmetric Trojan horses?,” Open Democracy, 
18 December 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net. Cas Mudde also wrote a piece for 
Open Democracy, stating that far-right party activity did not constitute a “Russian Trojan 
Horse.” See C. Mudde, “Russia’s Trojan horse,” Open Democracy, 18 December 2014, 
www.opendemocracy.net.
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by any means.”76 The “by any means” is an echo of the sentiments expressed 
by Zsolt Tyirityán, the leader of the Betyársereg. Yet on the other hand, the 
threat Fidesz poses to democracy is far greater and far more structural in 
orientation.
In a speech last July at the Bálványos Free Summer University in 
Tusnádfürdő, Orbán made clear that his goal is to create an “illiberal 
democracy.” He stated that Hungary is not the sum of individuals, but rather 
is a “community that needs to be organised, strengthened and developed, 
and in this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, 
a non-liberal state.” He continued by saying “it does not deny foundational 
values of liberalism, such as freedom for example, but it does not make this 
ideology a central element of state organisation, rather it applies a specific, 
national, particular approach in its stead.”77 Throughout the speech Orbán 
referred to “Christian Hungary,” which is often understood as a stance 
against secularism, liberal cosmopolitanism, and as being anti-Semitic. As 
such he stressed the distinction between illiberal “Christian democracy” 
versus liberal democracy, stating that liberalism and the European Union had 
lost their legitimacy after “the 2008 financial crisis, or the Western financial 
crisis.”78 The speech concluded that Hungary’s future is to look eastward 
at “today’s stars, Singapore, China, India, Turkey, and Russia.” He added 
that Hungary should be “searching for ways to part from Western dogmas, 
making ourselves independent from them … we need to state that democracy 
is not necessarily liberal.”
Since regaining as prime minister in 2010,79 Orbán has enacted a number 
of policies that were explicitly illiberal or anti-liberal in both the economic 
and political senses of the word. In 2013 the prime minister appointed György 
Matolcsy as the new governor of the Hungarian Central Bank. Previously, 
Matolcsy had advocated “unorthodox monetary policies” that included 
the nationalisation of privately managed pension fund assets that, along 
with other measures, including forint exchange rate adjustments, provided 
76 Quoted in R. Hodgson, “Bayer at Bay,” Budapest Times, 22 January 2013, 
www.budapesttimes.hu.
77 C. Tóth, “Full text of Viktor Orban’s speech at Bŭile Tuşnad (Tusnáfürdő) of 26 July 
2014,” Budapest Beacon, 29 July 2014, http://budapestbeacon.com.
78 Ibidem.
79 Orbán was prime minister as well in the first Fidesz coalition government from 1998–2002. 
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sufficient liquidity for Orbán to suspend talks with the IMF on a bailout 
loan.80  
The nationalisation of pension assets was merely one scheme in many, 
in which private assets have been nationalised and then resold to political 
allies and supporters. There were nationalisations of energy assets and public 
utilities, beginning with the Fidesz local council takeover of Pécs Water in 
2009, through to the purchase of German gas giant Eon assets in 2011. The 
list goes on, including the 2013 nationalisation of all tobacco shops, which 
were then re-licensed to political allies.81 Policy Agenda, an economic think 
tank, estimates that the Orbán governments have spent more than three 
trillion forint on acquiring hitherto privately owned business.82 The blog site 
Hungarian Spectrum suggests this is merely a scheme of asset transfers, in 
that the state is uninterested in actually holding the assets for the long term, 
at least outside of the energy sector. The blog writes that, in most cases, 
“the state doesn’t actually want to own these companies. Rather, it wants 
to change the ownership structure of a particular business sector. In plain 
language, to take away from some in order to give to others.”83 This can be 
seen as a different form of what David Harvey calls “accumulation through 
dispossession.” For Harvey, the dispossession is the sale of state assets 
through privatisation, depriving the public of collectively held assets, and is 
a key aspect of neo-liberalism. In the Hungarian case, Orbán’s government 
dispossesses a private asset holder through state action and then redistributes 
that wealth, not to the commonwealth, but into the holdings of a private 
political ally.
Politically, from coming to power in 2010 until the February by-election 
in 2015, Orbán’s Fidesz government has held a two-thirds super majority in 
the Hungarian parliament. As such, Orbán and his party have been able to 
rewrite the constitution with impunity. If they need a new law they simply pass 
one. If they need to change the constitution they simply do so. They reduced 
the number of seats in parliament from 386 to a politically convenient 199. In 
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fact, so sure were they of holding on to their two-thirds majority, that Fidesz 
made this the mandatory threshold for a whole host of laws. However, since 
February 2015, and especially after the Jobbik victory in the April 2015 by-
election, Fidesz has not held a two-thirds majority in parliament. Thus, it 
must regularly find support outside the party rank and file in order to pass its 
legislation. According to Princeton University professor Kim Scheppele, it 
has been Jobbik that has provided the support the government has needed.84 
Perhaps we have seen a very quiet victory of the far right in Hungary.
Previously, concerns had been the shift to the right of Fidesz voters. With 
“ardent anti-communism, and a shamefully opportunistic anti-liberalism 
as the natural connecting tissue of Orbán’s neo-conservative alliance,”85 
Fidesz supporters have been increasingly drawn to the far right worldview 
promoted by Jobbik, and to the view held by those further right that they 
are, the “Christian” defenders of the nation against assaults and onslaughts 
by enemies both without and within. But now, due to procedural issues, the 
government itself is dependent upon the cooperation and initiative of Jobbik 
parliamentarians. Vona may have become the power broker he wanted to 
be, but, more dangerous for Europe, Jobbik and its political agenda now 
appears to hold great sway in contributing to an illiberal politics of Central 
Europe. Jobbik is becoming increasing bold and increasingly self-assured. 
As a party it is unapologetic for its anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, anti-
Zionist positions; perhaps Europe needs to look more seriously at the broader 
implications of Jobbik’s 2014 campaign slogan, Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk 
(We’ll say it, we’ll solve it). Jobbik’s solutions may be not only undesirable, 
but also violent and exclusionary. Hungary’s shift to the right may pose one 
of the biggest challenges to the European Union yet.   
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